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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2010).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that, under Utah law, a private
easement is automatically created on a private road in favor of landowners abutting
the private road by virtue of a recorded plat.
Standard of review: Correctness. 'The question of whether or not an easement
exists is a conclusion of law." Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, %7, 977 P.2d 533.
Preservation for Appeal: Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There is no constitutional or statutory provision relevant to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute over a private lane ("Oak Lane") in Alpine. Utah.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeal's decision creating a private easement
in favor of Respondents on Oak Lane by virtue of the subdivision plat.
Procedural History
Petitioner Oak Lane Homeowners Association ("the Association") filed this case
in District Court on November 19, 2003. (R. 2-10.) On April 7, 2004, Respondents
Dennis Griffm and Renae Griffin ("the Griffins") filed a motion for summary judgment.
(R. 210-288.) On August 20, 2004, the Trial Court granted the Griffins' motion, based
on its own research. (R. 374-78.) On December 8, 2004, the Trial Court issued a second
5

ruling granting the Griffins' motion, this time on a different basis than that of the August
20, 2004 ruling. (R. 441-46.) The Association appealed the Trial Court's rulings.
(R.457-58.) On November 24, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court,
finding that an issue of fact precluded summary judgment, and remanded for further
proceedings. Oak Lane Homeowners Assoc, v. Griffin. 2006 UT App 465. 153 P.3d 740.
(R. 473-76.)
On remand to the Trial Court, the Griffins filed a second motion for summary
judgment on July 16. 2007. (R. 660-673.) After briefing and oral arguments, the trial
court granted the Griffins' motion and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
judgment on December 21, 2007, finding that the Griffins, as abutting landowners, were
entitled to a private easement on Oak Lane by virtue of the subdivision plat.1 (R. 600-04.)
The Association again appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Trial Court's ruling and adopted a new kind of private easement previously
unrecognized under Utah law - an automatic private easement in favor of abutting
landowners on a private road by virtue of a plat. See, Oak Lane Homeowners Assoc, v.
Griffin. 2009 UT App 248, 219 P.3d 64 ("Oak Lane IF). 2 The Association now appeals
the Court of Appeals' decision to this Court
Statement of Facts
Oak Lane is a private lane in the Oak Hills Subdivision, v^hich contains five lots.
Oak Lane IL 2009 UT App 248 at % 2. (R. 532.) On January 13. 1977. the seven original
1

A true and correct copy of the Trial Court's findings is included as Addendum A.
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owners of the five lots in the subdivision signed the plat.J Id. at ^ 3. (R. 532.) In the
"Owner's Dedication" on the plat, the owners expressly refused to dedicate the "Private
Lane" to the public by striking the dedicatory language:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ALL OF THE
UNDERSIGNED OWNERS OF ALL OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE HEREON AND SHOWN ON THIS
MAP, HAVE CAUSED THE SAME TO BE SUBDIVIDED INTO LOTS,
BLOCKS, STREETS AND EASEMENTS AND DO HEREBY DEDICATE
THE STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC AREAS AS INDICATED HEREON
FOR PERPETUAL USE OF THE PUBLIC.
Id. The Alpine City Council accepted the plat on the same day, likewise striking the
dedicatory acceptance language:
THE CITY COUNCIL OF ALPINE CITY, COUNTY OF UTAH,
APPROVES THIS SUBDIVISION AND HEREBY ACCEPTS THE
DEDICATION OF ALL STREETS, EASEMENTS, AND OTHER PARCELS
OF LAND INTENDED FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES FOR THE PERPETUAL
USE OF THE PUBLIC THIS 13th DAY OF JANUARY, A.D. 1977.
Id. The plat was recorded in 1977. Id.
The Griffins purchased lot 2 of the Oak Hills Subdivision in 1988. Id. at ^ 5. (R.
132, 139.) Lot 2 is accessed through a public road, High Bench Road. (R. 141.) In fact,
the garage on Lot 2 can only be accessed via High Bench Road. (R. 123.) The original
owners of Lot 2, the Van Wagoners, understood that Oak Lane was a private road and
used it only with permission. (R. 122-24, 128-130.) The Van Wagoners did not transfer
any interest in Oak Lane to the subsequent owners of Lot 2. Id. The second owners of
Lot 2, the Watkins, also understood that Oak Lane was a private road and used it only
A true and correct copy of the Oak Lane II decision is included as Addendum B.
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with permission. (R. 131-139.) The Griffins, the third owners of Lot 2. have
occasionally used Oak Lane by driving and parking their vehicles on it. (R. 305.)
In 2003, the owners of lots 1, 3, 4, and 5 formed the Association to maintain the
physical and legal aspects of Oak Lane as a private lane. Id. at % 6. (R. 305.) As part of
the formation of the Association, the seven original owners of the Oak Hills Subdivision
transferred their interest in Oak Lane via a quitclaim deed to the Association. Id. at f 7.
(R. 535-39.) The Griffins rejected the invitation to join the Association and the
accompanying obligation to their share of the maintenance and upkeep of the lane, but
continued to use Oak Lane for ingress and egress and for storage. Id, at ^j 6. In an effort
to prevent the Griffins' unauthorized use of Oak Lane, the Association placed boulders on
Oak Lane near Lot 2 in October and November 2003. Id. at ^ 7. (R. 305.) When the
Griffins continued using Oak Lane without permission, the Association initiated the
underlying action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Oak Lane II, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the Griffins are entitled
to a private easement over Oak Lane by virtue of a subdivision plat. The Court of
Appeals' decision created a new type of easement in Utah - private easement by plat - the
basis of which is an incorrect interpretation of Utah law. Specifically, the Oak Lane II
court ignored three viable Utah court cases that carve out exceptions to the automatic per
se private-easement-by-plat rule it created, and the secondary sources relied on by Oak

J

A true and correct copy of the Oak Hills Subdivision plat is included as Addendum C.
8

Lane II fail to provide the support for which they are cited.
ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals in Oak Lane II created new law in Utah in order to find that
the Griffins had an easement over Oak Lane, a private road, by virtue of the Oak Hills
Subdivision plat. This type of easement has not been previously recognized in Utah with
respect to private roads, and the legal underpinnings and rationale relied on by Oak Lane
II fail to support its creation of new law.
L

THE OAK LANE II COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED TUTTLE,
AND IGNORED OTHER APPLICABLE UTAH CASES
In ruling that Utah now recognizes a private easement on a private road based on

the reference in an abutting landowners' deed to the subdivision plat, the only Utah law
Oak Lane II court relied on (or analyzed) was Tuttle v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501, 126 P.
959 (1912). In focusing solely on Tuttle, the Oak Lane II court overlooked other, more
recent Utah caselaw relevant to the present dispute, which provide valid and applicable
legal principles that make the present dispute a poor choice upon which to create new
Utah law.
A.

Oak Lane II Ignored Other Applicable Utah Cases

The general rule in Utah is that a private easement arises on a public road abutting
a landowner based on the road being dedicated to the public. Mason v. State of Utah, 656
P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1982) (holding, an abutting landowner has a private easement of
ingress and egress to existing public highways."). The rationale for this general rule is
that purchasers of property abutting an active public road rely on the fact that the road is
9

public and thus intended to benefit properties abutting the road. Carrier v. Lindquist 27
P.3d 1112, 2001 UT 105,1J15; Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 243 P.2d 435, 448-49,
121 Utah 445 (1952) (Wolfe, CJ., concurring). Thus, if a public road is subsequently
vacated, abutting landowners still enjoy a private easement over the vacated road based
on such reliance. The subsequent abandonment of the public road (and thus the public
easement) has no effect on the surviving private easement enjoyed by abutting
landowners. Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d431, 437-38 (Utah 1993); see also Carrier v.
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Utah 2001) (same); Mason, 656 P.2d at 468 ("This private
easement of access has been held to survive the abandonment or vacation of the public
highway5*) (citations omitted). Other Utah caselaw expand and elaborate on this general
rule, and provide exceptions to the general rule that contravene the Oak Lane II decision.
1.

Oak Lane II Ignored Mason v. State of Utah

The first Utah case overlooked by the Oak Lane II court is Mason v. State of Utah,
656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), which involved a private easement over an abandoned public
highway. Id. at 466. The Mason landowner conveyed a strip of his land to the State in
1951 so that the State could build Highway 191. Twenty-five years later, the State
abandoned the highway and thereafter intended to destroy the highway and sell the strip
of land. Id. at 466. On appeal the abutting landowner claimed his private easement over
the abandoned highway prohibited the State from destroying portions of the abandoned
highway. Id. at 468. The Mason decision added a qualification to the general rule
creating private easements over public roads. "Except where changed by statutes

10

pertaining to limited access highways, [citation omitted], an abutting landowner has a
private easement of ingress and egress to existing public highways.'5 Id. at 468 (citations
omitted).
Mason thus qualified the general rule, and made it dependent on whether Utah
statutes limiting access to highways applied. This shows that Mason did not view the
general rule as an absolute per se rule, but that it had flexibility. Mason also shows that if
the road in question is something less than a public road (i.e. public access is limited on
the road thereby making the road quasi-private), a private easement fails to arise. In other
words, there are some situations in which an abutting landowner will not automatically
enjoy a private easement from a public road, regardless of his reliance.
The Mason court further injected considerations of reasonableness into the
application of the general rule: "Our interpretation of the abutting landowner's [private]
easement of access as being subject to precedent requirements of reasonableness in the
circumstances accords with what we consider the better-reasoned opinions on this
subject." Id. at 469 (citations omitted). The Mason court concluded, "Thus, the abutting
property owner has an easement over the abandoned highway only where (and to the
extent that) it is 'necessary7 for ingress and egress' to and from the property under the
standard established in Adney and elaborated here." Id. (emphasis added). Such
reasonable considerations of necessary ingress and egress were ignored by the Oak Lane
II court, which appeared to interpret the general rule creating a private easement as a per
se rule. Had the Oak Lane II court factored necessary ingress and egress into its analysis,
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it would have reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on the
Association's testimony that the Griffins access their property along a driveway which
connects their garage and property to a public road (High Bench Road). (R. 123, 141.)
The Griffins thus do not need Oak Lane to as a necessary means of ingress to and egress
from their property, and Oak Lane II erred by ignoring Mason's caveat to the general rule.
Although no recorded subdivision plat was at issue in Mason, the abutting
landowner in Mason had arguably more notice of his potential easement rights in the
highway than the constructive notice provided by a reference in his deed to a recorded
plat. See, e.g., Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.. Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,
1279 (Utah 1998) (stating, "documents duly recorded according to the real estate title of
the Utah Code impart constructive notice to all persons of their contents."). Better than
constructive notice, the abutting landowner in Mason had actual notice of the public
highway (and the easement rights attendant thereto) because he personally transferred the
strip of land to the State on which the State constructed and maintained the highway. The
abutting landowner in Mason thus had more notice of his potential easement rights than
abutting landowners like the Griffins who rely only on constructive notice provided by
deed references to a recorded plat. A plat distantly recorded in a county recorder's office,
which likely goes unreviewed by most property buyers, provides less notice of abutting
roads. By contrast, the abutting landowner in Mason had greater reliance and heightened
notice based on his own transfer of the land that became the abutting public highway and
his use of said highway.

12

2.

Oak Lane II Ignored Evans v. Board of Cty Commissioners

Another Utah case germane to the present dispute, and which went unnoticed by
the Oak Lane II court, is Evans v. Board of Cty Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697, 2004 UT
App 256. Evans initially cites Gillmore and Tuttle for the general rule that landowners
abutting a public road acquire by operation of law a private easement of access to their
property across the public road. Id. at 704 (citing Gillmore, 850 P.2d at 437; Tuttle, 126
P. at 962). After further analyzing caselaw from other jurisdictions, the Evans court,
citing Carrier, 27 P.3d 1112, 2001 UT 105, pulls back from the broad scope of the
aforementioned general rule: "However, if the street, or streets, at issue were legally
vacated prior to the property being purchased and the easement arising, the purchaser will
not have a private easement right. See Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at *[[15." M- at 704. Evans
then summarized this exception to the general rule: "a private easement over platted
streets arises upon the purchase of property with reference to the plat map, so long as the
roads have not been legally vacated prior to the purchase." Id. at 705. Thus, the Evans
court carved out a significant limitation to the general rule based on the timing of the
vacation of the public road. If the public road was vacated before the abutting landowner
purchased the abutting property (and thus prior to the creation of the private easement
running concurrently with the public easement over the public road), then the purchaser
of the abutting property "will not have a private easement right." Id.
Again, Evans's holding indicates at least two qualifications to the general rule.
The first is that the general rule is not a per se, automatic rule that is immediately
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triggered if a deed references a plat showing roads abutting properties in a subdivision.
Second, and more importantly, the private easement expires as a matter of law if the
public road is vacated (and thereby becomes a private road) prior to the abutting
landowner's purchase of the abutting property. Viewed differently, once the public road
was vacated in Evans, it became a private road, and thus no private easement-by-plat
could arise. The present case is no different. Although no public easement previously
applied to Oak Lane, there is no difference in the private road in Evans and the private
road in the present case. According to Evans, the Oak Lane II court erred in granting a
private easement over Oak Lane based on the plat.
3.

Oak Lane II Ignored Carrier v. Lindquist

The Evans court made an issue of the timing of the abandonment of the public
easement based on Carrier, supra. In Carrier, the court considered the timing of the
abandonment of the public easement: ''Because the alley had not been legally vacated at
the time of plaintiffs' purchase, the trial court was correct in finding that plaintiffs'
reliance on the plat map entitles them to private easements over the alley abutting their
properties as depicted on the plat map." Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at ^f 15. On this point the
Carrier court distinguished Carrier from Tuttle, stating that the Tuttle plaintiff did not
have a private easement across an adjoining landowner's property over a platted avenue
because the public road had been vacated at the time the plaintiff purchased the property.
Tuttle. 126 P. at 965.
Based on Carrier, the Oak Lane II court erred in granting a private easement over
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Oak Lane based on the recorded plat. In Carrier, the alley had not been vacated and thus
the plaintiff was justified in relying on the plat map to create a private easement. Carrier,
2001 UT 105 at ^15. Conversely, if the alley had been vacated at the time the plaintiff
purchased the abutting lot, the Carrier court would have concluded that any reliance on
the plat map for a private easement was unjustified. Such is the same situation the
Griffins are in. Whether a previous public easement on Oak Lane had been vacated
(thereby making it a private road) or whether it was a simple private road at the time the
Griffms purchased their lot there is no difference. Either way Carrier mandates that as a
private road at the time the Griffins purchase the abutting land, no private easement
arises.
4.

The Exceptions Provided in Mason, Evans and Carrier Equally
Apply to the Present Case

Mason, Evans and Carrier - all three Utah cases - confirm that exceptions exist to
the creation of a private easement on an abandoned public road. Specifically, if an
abutting landowner purchases property abutting previously-abandoned public road or
abutting a road covered by limited public easement (making the road quasi-private), the
abutting landowner does not obtain a private easement in the abandoned road. These
three Utah courts intuitively base their exceptions on the fact that at the time the abutting
landowner purchases the property abutting the road, the road is no longer public, but is
instead private. The fact that the abutting landowner's property and the road are platted
and referenced in the abutting landowner's deed makes no difference to this exception.
Such an exception makes sense. The abutting landowner, upon purchasing the
15

property abutting the road that was once public but is now private, cannot solely rely on
the plat to conclude an easement exists on the road in question. According to the above
caselaw, conversion of the public road into a private road extinguishes the automatic
private easement championed by the Oak Lane II court.
5.

Oak Lane II Failed to Consider the Intent of the Original
Grantors and Grantees

Oak Lane II appeared to hedge on propounding an inflexible per se rule
automatically creating a private easement for landowners abutting a private road based on
the private road being depicted in a plat. Although Oak Lane IPs exception does not
track along the same grounds as the exceptions in Mason, Evans and Carrier, Oak Lane II
nonetheless appears to carve out an exception based on intent of the grantor and grantee,
as well as the equities of the case: "the continued vitality of such an easement turns on the
equities that exist at the time of conveyance. [Citation omitted]. . . . a part}7 would only
have to plead and prove that such a right of use was intended to be covered by the grant
or sale of the property based on documents relied on at the time of the conveyance, the
parties' knowledge and intent, and the character or purpose of the road or common area at
the time of the conveyance." Oak Lane II, 219 P.3d at 69.
Notwithstanding this exception (which is based on an apparent concern for the
intent of the original grantor and grantee of the abutting property). Oak Lane II ignored
such trial testimony from the original developer-owners and the first predecessors-ininterest of the Griffins (the Van Wagoners). The original developer-owners (grantors)
and the Van Wagoners (grantees) all testified that they knew Oak Lane was private, they
16

the Van Wagoners did not intend to own any part of Oak Lane, and the Van Wagoners
used Oak Lane by permission. (R. 122-24, 128-139.) Along with the Van Wagoners
eschewing ownership in Oak Lane and using it by permission rather than by easement, the
Van Wagoners were absolving themselves of all obligations of maintenance associated
with Oak Lane. The Oak Lane II decision effectively strips grantees such as the Van
Wagoners of such choice by automatically granting to them a private easement in an
abutting road.
In sum, Oak Lane IPs refusal to apply its own intent-based exception to the facts
in dispute is perplexing because it sets forth the exception but fails to apply it. Clearly
any such intent issue is factually-sensitive and creates a disputed issue of fact unworthy of
an award of summary judgment. Oak Lane II thus erred in not reversing the trial court on
this issue.
B.

Tlittle Provides the Basis for the General Rule that a Private Easement
Arises Where a Public Easement Exists, But Otherwise Is Bad
Precedent for Expanding a Private Easement to Cover Private Roads

Oak Lane II based its creation of the new private easement on an old Utah case,
Tuttle v. Sowadski, supra. In Turtle, the roadway in question was initially dedicated as a
public road by virtue of a plat. Id. at 960-61. The Tuttle road was later deemed
abandoned based on five years of nonuse as a public road. Id. at 961. In the years
following the abandonment, the Tuttle appellants (the abutting landowners) began to use
the roadway for "flower beds, and planted shrubbery thereon" and even erected a fence on
the former roadway, which was maintained for more than 30 years. Id. Sometime
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thereafter, the Tuttle respondents purchased property abutting the abandoned road and
then subsequently sued the appellants for blocking access to their property via the
abandoned road. Id. at 964-65.
The Tuttle court recognized that a public easement is created by plat when a plat
dedicates a road to the public, and also recognized that, at the same time, a private
easement can arise by virtue of the plat, giving abutting landowners a private easement
that can survive the extinguishment of the public easement. Id. However, Tuttle held that
because the public road had been abandoned, a private easement in a non-existent public
highway could not arise:
There being no public highways or easement in existence when [the Tuttles]
obtained their lots, no such easement could pass to them as appurtenant to the
lots, nor could a private easement be created in a public highway because no
such highway was in existence.
Id. at 963. The same principal applies in the present dispute where no public
easement was ever created over Oak Lane. In fact, the Oak Hills Subdivision plat
clearly reflects the intention of the original grantors of preventing a public
dedication, instead retaining the use of Oak Lane as a private lane. The Oak Lane
II court completely ignored this critical fact.
Despite the above quote from Tuttle. the Oak Lane II court found that Tuttle
supports the creation of a new private easement in favor of abutting landowners,
regardless of whether a public easement ever existed. Oak Lane IL 219 P.3d at 70.
Though the Oak Lane II court acknowledges that the "Tuttle court clearly recognized that
an independent private right arises when a public right to use a street has been created by
18

a plat/' it saw "no reason why such a right, regardless of the characterization of such
right would not also arise when a person purchases a lot with reference to a recorded plat
showing private roadways instead of public roadways." Id. at ^ 17. In other words, Oak
Lane IPs justification for the new easement law in Utah is: there }s no reason not to.
In addition to its no-reason-not-to rationale, Oak Lane II weakly suggests that the
Griffins' deed referencing a recorded plat provides some kind of additional, heightened
notice to the potential buyer of the abutting property that the plats depiction of a road
abutting the property being purchase provides the potential purchaser a private easement.
This cryptic rationale, however, ignores the reality and practicalities of landowners
purchasing a property, especially a property7 in a subdivision. Common sense indicates
that potential homebuyers inspect the property they are interested in purchasing. Such
potential buyers walk around the property, walk through it, walk over the drive way, etc.
They also likely observe the street their driveway empties onto. Although such hands-on
due diligence provides a potential buyer far more notice of abutting streets, access and
egress than a distantly-recorded plat, Oak Lane II nonetheless indicates that constructive
notice provided by a plat governs over actual observation and actual notice provided by a
property inspection. According to Oak Lane II, potential homebuyers rely more on a
4

The Oak Lane II court discusses the reference in the Griffins' deed to easements of record.
Specifically, the deed vesting title in lot 2 to the Griffins provides that the deed is "Subject to
easements, covenants, conditions and restrictions of record." However, clearly this reference to
easements is to easements and other encumbrances existing on lot 2, not any private easement
existing on neighboring property or abutting private roads. Thus, the Griffins and the Oak Lane
II court are misplaced if they interpret the reference to "easements" in the Griffins' deed as
strengthening the Griffins' claim to a private easement along Oak Lane. Such an interpretation is
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recorded plat than an actual inspection and physical investigation of the property to be
purchased.
This point is critical to the present case because when the Griffins purchased their
property, they knew based on a drive up to the house that the property's driveway
stemmed from High Bench Road. (R. 141.)- They had to notice that although the
property abutted Oak Lane, Oak Lane provided the property no drive way, entry way or
paved means of access to the garage or front of the house. They should have thus
discerned that their property was not intended to be accessed from Oak Lane. The Oak
Lane II court overlooked such realities and practicalities of accessing the Griffins'
property, and the Griffins' actual knowledge thereof, but instead concluded that the
Griffins' garnered greater reliance from the constructive notice provided by their deed's
reference to a plat recorded at the county recorder's office. Finding that such constructive
notice trumps actual notice makes no sense in light of the absence of evidence provided
by the Griffins indicating that they actually relied on the reference in their deed to the
plat, or that they actually reviewed the plat prior to purchasing their property.
Perhaps most galling about Oak Lane II, is the inequitable and unfair result where
abutting landowners like the Griffins can take advantage of and use another's private road
for their own benefit and enjoyment, and then refuse to provide their share of the
maintenance and upkeep of the private road. Such is all the Association has ever wanted
- if the Griffins use Oak Lane then they should help shoulder a proportion of the costs of

misplaced and takes the '"easements5* reference out of context.
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maintenance and upkeep. Oak Lane II effectively saddles the Association with the
burden of covering the Griffins' share of the costs of maintenance and upkeep. Adding
insult to injury, Oak Lane II ignores the fact that the Griffins use Oak Lane
notwithstanding the availability to them of another road - a public road - by which the
Griffins can easily obtain ingress to and egress from their property.
C.

The Oak Lane II Court Fails to Justify its Departure from Utah's
Traditional Four-Easement Structure

Utah law recognizes four, and only four, types of easements. These four
r

r

n

o

easements are express , implied , prescriptive , and necessity . See Potter, 1999 UT App
95 at ^[8. These four types of easements have been recognized under Utah law for
decades and have express and settled requirements. The Oak Lane II court does not
suggest we should abandon this traditional four-easement structure, which serves Utah
well. It is only because the Griffins fail to fall wdthin one of these four types of easement
that they have created a new, fifth type of easement in Utah. Yet the Griffins provide no
rationale why this Court should abandon this traditional four-easement structure, other
5

An express easement is the most commontypeof easement and it is "expressly created
between two parties in a land transaction or conveyance by an express grant or an express
reservation." Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at \9.
6
Under Utah law, an easement by implication requires: (1) that unity of title was followed by
severance; (2) that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of severance; (3)
that the easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) that
the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
7
To establish a prescriptive easement a party must show "a use that is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3)
adverse, and (4) continuous for at least twenty years." Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at \ 17.
o

An easement by necessity arises '"when there is a conveyance of part of a tract of land which is
so situated that either the part conveyed or the part retained is surrounded with no access to a
road to the outer world.'" Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at |18 (citation omitted).
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than it would be convenient for them to be able to use Oak Lane to occasionally park a
trailer or boat. The Oak Lane II court translated the Griffins' justification into the
rationale found in Oak Lane II - there's no reason not to create a private easement by plat
in Utah. Such reasoning and justification fails to rise to the level to justify upsetting this
well-settled easement law in Utah, and is a shaking foundation upon which to base a new
easement.
II.

OAK LANE IPS RELIANCE ON SECONDARY SOURCES IS
MISPLACED AND UNPERSUASIVE
Other than its sole reliance on Tuttle (for Utah law), Oak Lane II heavily relies on

secondary sources to justify its expansion of Tuttle to create private easements to abutting
landowners over private roads. Specifically, Oak Lane II relies on four secondary sources
to support its creation of the new private easement-by-plat: (a) the treatise Utah Real
Property Law. (b) 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property, (c) the
treatise Thompson on Real Property and (d) the treatise Powell on Real Property. Oak
Lane IPs reliance on such secondary sources, however, is misplaced.
A.

Utah Real Property Law

Oak Lane II cites David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Utah Real Property
Law, claiming that this treatise "interpreted Utah's case law in the same way." Oak Lane
II, 219 P.3d at 69. Specifically, Oak Lane II quotes Utah Real Property Law for the
following proposition: "w[w]hen an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map
(or plat or plan), a purchaser . . . of a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over
private streets as laid out on the map even if the easement is not expressly created in the
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documents of conveyance5" Id (quoting Utah Real Property Law § 12.02(b)(2)(iii). at
438 (2008)) (see excerpt in Addendum D in the Appendix). However, this statement in
Utah Real Property Law (quoted by Oak Lane II) contains no citation or reference. It is
thus unsupported by any Utah caselaw. Such can hardly provide Oak Lane II the
justification for expanding easement law in Utah. Nor can such a secondary source with
no caselaw support stand up to scrutiny on appeal.
Oak Lane II further quotes Utah Real Property Law: "'[I]mplied easements arise
from the circumstances of a transaction or the circumstances surrounding the properties
involved. Courts are willing to imply an easement because they are convinced that the
parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances accompanying a
conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of the
perceived, unexpressed intent of the parties derived from the facts of the situation/5' Oak
Lane IL 219 P.3d at 69 (quoting Utah Real Property Law 12.02(b)(2) at 436 (2008)).
Oak Lane II, however, ignored verbiage three paragraphs later in the same section of
Utah Real Property Law, wrhich states: "Strict rules apply to the creation of implied
easements because they are not specifically mentioned in the recorded documents
applying to the affected properties. Fairness to subsequently affected third parties
demands that implied easements should arise only under convincing and compelling
circumstances/5 Utah Real Property Law § 12.02(b)(2) at 436 (2008). Thus, to the
extent this Court is willing to analogize a private easement over a private lane to an
implied easement (as Oak Lane II appeared to do with its second quote from Utah Real
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Property Law), the strict rules accompanying application of implied easements, fairness
to other affected parties, and convincing and compelling circumstances must also apply.9
Finally, notwithstanding Oak Lane IPs extensive analysis of Tuttle and reliance on
Utah Real Property Law to justify extending Tuttle to private roads, Oak Lane II failed to
notice that Utah Real Property Law's section on easements by plat failed to cite Tuttle for
its suggestion that private easements should be extended over private lanes. In fact,
nowhere in the easement section of Utah Real Property Law is there a reference to Tuttle.
Utah Real Property Law thus hardly provides the clear legal support for a privateeasement-by-plat, as Oak Lane II leads one to believe.
B.

25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property §21

Oak Lane IPs next secondary source cited as justification for its extension of
Tuttle is 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property §21, from which Oak
Lane II quotes:
Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to a
plat or map on which streets, alleys, parks, and other open areas are shown, an
easement therein is entitled, and exists entirely independent of dedication to a
public use. . . . An easement will be implied from a map or plat only if it was
intended by the parties, and no easement can be implied where the grantor has no
interest in the roads reflected on the pl[a]t map/'
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property §21, at 519-20 (2004)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (see excerpt in Addendum E in the Appendix).

9

Utah Real Property law states that implied easements are created by circumstances of the
transaction or surrounding parties involved, and easements must be reasonably necessary for the
enjoyment of the dominant parcel. Utah Real Property Law^ § 12.02(b)(2) at 437.
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This private-easement-by-plat rule is not a per se automatic rule - i.e. if a deed references
a plat that shows a private road abutting a lot, then the abutting lot owner automatically
has a private easement over the private road. Instead, this rule is subject to the intent of
the parties (as emphasized in the quote above). Thus, according to this secondary source,
courts do not just stop at the grantee's deed and the plat map, but instead look into what
the original grantor and original grantee intended.10
As explained above, the original developers and owners of lot 2 intended to keep
Oak Lane private, intended to allow lot 2's owners to use it by permission only, and
intended to keep ownership of Oak Lane from lot 2's owners. At the very least, such
issues of intent are no proper for summary judgment.
C.

7 Thompson on Real Property

Oak Lane II also relies on 7 Thompson on Real Property to justify its extension of
Utah law:
'A developer's sale of lots in a subdivision according to a recorded plat creates
private easement rights in favor of purchasers in any area set apart for their use.'
Those rights. . . exist whether purchasers have given consideration for the
property's higher value by paying a higher price. Even where the dedication by
plat or map is not formally accepted by the appropriate authorities, persons who
rely on the plat in making a purchase acquire an interest akin to an easement
appurtenant in the rights of way.'
Oak Lane II 219 P.3d at 70 (quoting 7 Thompson on Real Property §60.03(a)(3)(iii), at

Further, American Jurisprudence on Deeds contradicts this American Jurisprudence on
Easements and Licenses: "Reference to a map in a conveyance normally is utilized merely as a
descriptive tool to identify the property and, therefore, does not itself convey." 23 Am. Jur. 2d,
Deeds §232.
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480-81) (emphasis added) (see excerpt in Addendum F in the Appendix). Two sentences
later in Thompson, it states: "this right applies to all members of the subdivision who
purchased in reliance on the plat or plan, not merely those with property abutting the
easement.'* 7 Thompson on Real Property §60.03(a)(3)(iii), at 281 (emphasis added).
Thus, Tlwmpson does not espouse a per se automatic rule providing a private easement to
landowners abutting a private road referenced on a plat. Instead, Thompson requires the
purchaser (i.e. Griffms) to provide evidence that they relied on the plat's reference to the
private road (i.e. Oak Lane).
The Oak Lane II court fails to cite any such evidence in support of the Griffins'
supposed reliance on the subdivision plat and to the extent they provided any such
evidence, the issue of reliance would be a disputed issue of fact improper for summary
judgment.
D.

Powell on Real Property

Oak Lane II also relies on 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.06
for the following:
'Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street
designated in the conveyance, or refers to a map on which spaces for streets, parks,
or other common uses are shown, but the conveyance says nothing about the
creation of an easement or a dedication to a public use, the conveyee of the land
acquires an easement with respect to the street or the areas shown on the map.
Oak Lane IT 21 P.3d at 70 (quoting 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property §
34.06, at 34-40 to 34-41) (see excerpt in Addendum G in the Appendix). Powell
essentially restates the general rule set forth above, but is based on caselaw from other
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states. In relying on such non-Utah caselaw, Powell fails to take into consideration the
exceptions carved out by Utah caselaw such as Mason, Evans and Carrier. As set forth
above, Mason, Evans and Carrier cut back on the per se automatic rule stated in Powell,
and establish exceptions that apply to the present case. Accordingly, Powell provides
poor support for Oak Lane IFs expansion of Utah's private easement law.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Court of
Appeals' decision in Oak Lane II, in as much as it inappropriately creates a newautomatic private easement by plat unsupported by Utah law, and remand this case for
further consideration in light of the correct law.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February 2010.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

Steven Quesenberry
y^
J. Bryan Quesenberry/^
Attorneys for Petitioner
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RLED

SHAWN D, TURNER (5813)
LARSON. TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C.

Fourth Judicial District Court
of
Utah County State of Ulah
» ^
f 7 A,, £ - ,

121S West South Jordan Parkway, Suits B
-J-J^^LfZU
South Jordan, UT 84095
(§01)446-6464
FN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^LL_DBpulv

OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

Plaintiff.
v.

I Civil No, 030405130
Judge Fred D. Howard

DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and RENAE GRIFFIN;

1

Defendants

DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and RENAE GRIFFIN,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
v.
OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION;
Cou n terc 1 a i m Defen dant

This matter came before the Court on October ], 2007 for hearing on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel Stephen Quesenberry.
Defendant P.enae Griffin was present as was Griffins' counsel Shawn D, Turner.
The Court having read the pleadings related to this matter filed by the respective parties and having
heard oral argument as presented by respective counsel it hereby finds as follows:

]

FINDINGS OF FACT
The AlpineCity Council approved and accepted the Oak Hills Haven plat which contained five lots,
on January >35 1977.
in the Owners' Dedication section of the plat all of the original Gwners of the land executed a secncr
which reads'
KNOW ALL MEN 3Y THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ALL OF THE UNDERSIGNED
OWNERS OF ALL OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE
HEREOF AND SHOWN ON THIS WAP, HAVE CAUSED THE SAME TO 3E SUBDIVIDED
INTO LOTS, BLOCKS, STREETS AND EASEMENTS AND DO HEREBY DEDICATE THE
STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC AREAS AS INDICATED HEREON FOR PERPETUAL USE.
OF THE PUBLIC,
The portion of the Dedication beginning with "AND DO HEREBY" and continuing thereafter to the
crosses OUT on tne pjaL
Tht plai clearly identifies Oak Lane as a "Private Lane'*.
Tne Oak Hills Haven Subdivision consists of five lots
Defendants, Dennis and ReNae Griffin own Lot 2 of the Oak Hills Haven Subdivision.
The Griffins purchased the property in 1988,
For almost sixteen years, and until October of 2003, the Griffins accessed their home on Lot 2 on a
nearly daily basis by using Oak Lane, the cu) de sac m the Oak Hills Haven SUbdivisjon.
In 2003 all of the other lot owners in theSubriivision formed the Oak Lane Homeowners Association
On or about Ji]y 22,2003. the Association obtained a quit eiann deed from the original owners of the
\Qt$ in the subdK jsicm to the property compHsmg the voad
Baser sclelv on this ci'j't claim oeed, the Piamhff claims evmersb'p of the ~oad
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff has standee to bnng its aet'on m this merer
When fie Oak Lane Subcm sion was cheated an easement was cheated o^e* the private lane.
o

contained in the subdivision, for a!) those property owners who abut the lane.
3.

The Griffins are property owners whose property abuts the Jane.

4.

The Griffins property-was sold to them by reference to the recorded Plat and their property is
described by reference to that plat,

5.

The Griffins have an easement, for access, ingrtss and egress from Oak Lane to their property,

Dated this,-£/day of December, 2007.
BY THE COURT

J^^S^m^rO

HoiyPred D. Howard | K | ^ ^ ^ ^ - | ; jf
District -Court Judge
% ^ S ^ ^ ^ i S
(F
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Oak Lane Homeowners Association, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Dennis L. Griffin and Renae Griffin,
Defendants and Appellees.
Case No. 20080084-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2009 UT App 248; 219 P.3d 64; 638 Utah Adv. Rep. 26; 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 268
September 1 1 , 2009, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [ * * * 1 ]
r
ourth District, Provo Department, 030405130. The Honorable Fred D. Howard.
Dak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 153 P.3d 740, 2006 UT App 465, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 507 (2006)
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant homeowners association claimed ownership of a lane. The Fourth
District, Provo Department, Utah, entered a summary judgment ruling in favor of appellee property
owners.
OVERVIEW: The subdivision was platted showing five lots abutting the lane. One of the lots was
accessible from the lane as well as from a roadway. The owners of the other lots formed the association
to manage the maintenance and landscaping of the lane. The original owners of the platted lots quitclaimed their interests in the lane to the association. The association subsequently placed boulders on
the lane to prevent the property owners from using the lane. The association argued that the trial court
erred when it determined that the property owners had an easement by plat to use the lane to access
their property. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the summary
judgment because Utah case law fully supported the determination that a right to use the lane to access
the property owners' lot arose in favor of the property owners when their deed referenced the recorded
plat showing that their lot abutted the lane, given that the lane was used as a road to access lots within
the subdivision at the time the property owners' purchased the lot. Summary judgment was appropriate
because none of the disputed facts identified by the association were material.
OUTCOME: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment ruling.

CORE TERMS: easement, plat, lane, street, roadway, landowner, recorded, map, private easement,
conveyance, deed, summary judgment, abut, right to use, ownership, abutting, abandoned, common
areas, platted, original owners, right of use, referenced, purchaser, acquire, grantee, abutting owners,
appurtenant, continuous, case law, material facts
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O P I N I O N BY: Gregory K. Orme ^
OPINION

[**66]

ORME ^ Judge:

[ * P 1 ] Oak Lane Homeowners Association (the Association) appeals a summary judgment ruling in favor
of Dennis L. and Renae Griffin. More specifically, the Association claims that the trial court created a new
type of easement, "an easement by plat," which is not recognized in Utah. Further, the Association urges
t h a t there are three material facts in dispute relating to the use, ownership, and nature of the private
roadway in question. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
[ * P 2 ] In 1977, the Oak Hills Subdivision was platted, showing five lots that abutted Oak Lane. Lots 1, 3,
4, and 5 were accessible only by way of Oak Lane, but lot 2 was accessible from Oak Lane as well as from a
public roadway. x The plat initially included the following language:
Know all men by these presents that we, all of the undersigned owners of all of the property
described in the surveyor's [ * * * 2 ] certificate hereon and shown on this map, have caused the
same to be subdivided into lots, blocks, streets and easements and do hereby dedicate the
streets and other public areas as indicated hereon for perpetual use of the public.

FOOTNOTES
I The Association points out that the driveway on lot 2 runs only from the public road.

[ * P 3 ] The original seven owners of the five lots signed the plat, after crossing out the portion of the
above language that dedicated the streets and other public areas to the public, so that it read as follows:
Know all men by these presents that we, all of the undersigned owners of all of the property
described in the surveyor's certificate hereon and shown on the map, have caused the same to
be subdivided into lots, blocks, streets and easements.
The Alpine City Council accepted the plat, also deleting from its resolution language about accepting the
dedication, and the plat was recorded in 1977. Both sides and the trial court correctly infer that, under
these circumstances, Oak Lane remained a private roadway.

[ * P 4 ] One year before the subdivision was created, the Van Wagoners purchased the land that became
lot 2 and, as original owners, signed the plat. Seven years later, they sold [ * * * 3 ] lot 2 to the Watkinses,
who lived there for approximately five years. The Association submitted affidavits from both the Van
Wagoners and the Watkinses reciting that they "understood that Oak Lane was a private road and used it
only with permission."
[ * P 5 ] The Griffins are the third owners of lot 2, having purchased the property in 1988. Their deed
references the 1977 subdivision plat and states that they obtained title to the property "[s]ubject to
easements, covenants, conditions and restrictions of record."
[ * P 6 ] In 2003, the owners of lots 1, 3, 4 , and 5 formed the Association to manage the maintenance and
landscaping of Oak Lane. As alleged in one landowner's affidavit, the other lot owners "invited the Griffins
to j o i n the [Association because they were using Oak Lane by permission without sharing any of the ongoing expenses," but the Griffins did not want to join. The affidavit states that "Mrs. Griffin . . . refused to
join . . . , refused to pay for anything, and asserted her intent to continue using Oak Lane."
[ * * 6 7 ] [ * P 7 ] The original owners of the platted lots quit-claimed their interests in Oak Lane to the
Association. The Association accordingly claims ownership of Oak Lane. The Association
[ * * * 4 ] subsequently placed boulders on Oak Lane to prevent the Griffins from using the lane.
[ * P 8 ] In its ruling on summary judgment, the trial court determined that "[w]hen the Oak Lane
Subdivision was created, an easement was created over the private lane, contained in the subdivision, for
all those property owners who abut the lane." Because "[t]he Griffins are property owners whose property
abuts the lane," and because "[t]he Gnffms['] property was sold to them by reference to the recorded Plat
and [described] their property . . . by reference to that plat," the trial court concluded that "[t]he Griffins
have an easement, for access, ingress and egress from Oak Lane to their property." The Association
appeals from this ruling. 2
FOOTNOTES
2 This is the Association's second appeal in this matter. See Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin,
2006 UT App 465, 153 P.3d 740. The Association was successful in having an earlier adverse summary
judgment reversed. See id. PP 1, 10.

SSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[ * P 9 ] The Association challenges the trial court's summary judgment ruling on both legal and factual
jrounds. ^ ^ P u r s u a n t to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an order granting summary
udgment is sustainable [ * * * 5 ] "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
)n file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
hat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56fc). "[W]hen
reviewing a grant of summary judgment' we give 'no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law:
hose conclusions are reviewed for correctness.'" Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 2006 UT App 465,
> 6, 153 P.3d 740 (quoting Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 2 1 , P 7, 44 P.3d 704),
\NALYSIS
. The Trial Court's Legal Ruling Is Correct
[ * P 1 0 ] The Association first challenges the summary judgment ruling on the ground that the trial court
>rred when it determined that the Griffins had an "easement by plat" to use Oak Lane to access their
)roperty. The Association is simply wrong to the extent it alleges that Utah does not recognize easement
ights in landowners whose property abuts roads referenced in recorded plat. As indicated in Carrier v.

Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112, H / * 2 , ?"[u]nder Utah law, landowners whose property abuts public
streets, alleys, and public ways that appear on a plat map are entitled to [ * * * 6 ] a private easement over
those public ways." Id. P 12.
[ * P 1 1 ] We acknowledge that Utah case law has not specifically addressed whether an easement in a
private roadway arises based on a deed's reference to a plat showing that a landowner's property abuts a
private roadway. However, HAf5 "?Utah's jurisprudence readily supports the general proposition that a right
of use may arise when property is purchased or otherwise transferred with reference to a recorded plat
describing streets or common areas within a subdivision. The reasoning in Tuttie v. Sowadzki, 4 1 Utah 5 0 1 ,
126 P. 959 (1912), while specifically addressing the rights of the owners of property abutting a once-public
street, supports a conclusion that persons who purchase property, which property along with abutting
roadways are identified in a recorded plat, may obtain a right to use such roadways based on the
circumstances surrounding their acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the roadway is public or
private.
[ * P 1 2 ] In Tuttie, the respondents, who owned property abutting what had been identified on the plat as
Wabash Avenue, sought to have the appellant, Helen Sowadzki, remove materials that blocked the street.
See id. at 960, 962. [ * * * 7 ] The respondents alleged that they held a private easement of access, which
could not be abandoned by the public or taken without compensation based on the original owner "platting
the land into blocks and lots which abut upon streets, and in selling such lots with reference to such plat."
[ * * 6 8 ] Id. at 962. The respondents claimed their private right of access could be enforced against other
abutting landowners, including Sowadzki, even though the other landowners were not the original
developer who had platted and sold the lots with reference to the plat, because "every owner was
compelled to keep the avenue open so that every other owner might perpetually enjoy his easement." Id.
at 964-65.
[ * P 1 3 ] The recorded plat, filed in 1891, identified Wabash Avenue as a street and dedicated it to the
public. See id. at 9 6 0 - 6 1 . In a prior related case, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Wabash Avenue
had been abandoned as a public roadway due to a statute permitting abandonment following five years of
non-use. See id. Because Wabash Avenue had never actually been used as a roadway, it was abandoned in
1896 as a public road, leaving a private easement that ran with Sowadzki's property. 3 See id. at 951-62,
965.
FOOTNOTES
3 Sowadzki's [ * * * 8 ] acts and intentions showed she abandoned her private easement, as such, but
the Court determined that title to a portion of the intended street reverted to her as an abutting
landowner. See Tuttie v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 5 0 1 , 126 P. 959, 965 (1912). Cf. Sears v. Op den City, 572
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1977) ("[T]he interest a municipal body acquires in the streets in a platted
subdivision is a determinable fee. Upon vacation by the governing authorities, the fee reverts to the
abutting property owner.").

[ * P 1 4 ] The Utah Supreme Court discussed Utah law regarding easements created by plats. See id. at
962-65. H / V 4 ?Under Utah law, when an owner creates a plat that clearly identifies a street and then sells
the property that abuts the street by referencing the plat, the purchaser of the lot acquires a right that
prevents the original owner from vacating or obstructing the street. See id. at 962. When the recorded plat
dedicates the street to the public, then a person whose land abuts the platted street obtains both a public
and private easement. See id. The private easement, which is independent of the public easement, can
survive if the public easement is abandoned or vacated, but only if the two easements [ * * * 9 ] were once
held contemporaneously. See id. at 962, 964. This private easement is appurtenant to the property and
"constitutes a property right which can only be taken from [the affected owners] or obstructed by making
proper compensation." Id. at 962.
[*P15]

Because the Tuttie respondents claimed rights against another person whose property abutted

the street, Sowadzki, instead of against the original landowner who recorded the plat, the Court also
addressed what rights abutting lot owners have as against one another. See id. at 963-65. The Court
acknowledged that even if a street was abandoned as a public street, abutting owners may not obstruct the
street so that other abutting owners may not use it. See id. at 963. The rights of abutting owners as
against each other are based upon equitable principles. See id. at 963-64. In determining whether equity
justified an abutting owner's right to use the street, the Court considered the circumstances that existed at
the time the abutting owner purchased his or her property. See id. at 964.
[ * P 1 6 ] The Tuttle court determined that Sowadzki initially had a private easement to use the designated
street that survived its abandonment by the public. See Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 5 0 1 , 126 P. 959, 96465 (1912). [ * * * 1 0 ] However, it was clear from Sowadzki's actions, i.e., building a fence and planting a
garden and shrubs in the area earmarked as a street and never using the designated street as a method of
ingress or egress, that any private easement for access had clearly been abandoned by the time the Tuttle
respondents purchased their property. See id. at 9 6 1 , 963, 965. Because they had purchased their lots
many years after Wabash Avenue had been abandoned as a public roadway, from someone other than the
original owner who platted the property, and they had clear notice at the time they purchased their
property that no actual roadway existed, the Court found it inequitable to grant them any easement in the
area once intended to be Wabash Avenue. See id. at 963-65. See also Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, PP
14-15, 37 P.3d 1112 (distinguishing Tuttle and concluding that the landowners had a private easement in a
roadway when the [ * * 6 9 ] roadway had been vacated by the public only after they had purchased their
property).
[ * P 1 7 ] The Tuttle court clearly recognized that an independent private right arises when a public right to
use a street has been created by a plat. See 126 P. at 962, 964. We see no reason [ * * * l i ] why such a
right, regardless of the characterization of such right, 4 would not also arise when a person purchases a lot
with reference to a recorded plat showing private roadways instead of public roadways. The same principle-that land purchasers should be able to expect that a street identified in a referenced plat is what it
ourports to be in the plat, i.e., a street by which to access their property—still applies. Accordingly, as long
3S a roadway is still in use as a roadway at the time a lot is purchased, something "tangible" at the time
:he property was purchased on which to base the right of access would exist, id. at 963, and it would be
nequitable to deprive a lot owner of such a right years later, as the Association is trying to do in this case.
'.n Tuttle, if the avenue had been used as a private roadway by Sowadzki at the time the respondents
purchased their lots, the Supreme Court's reasoning indicates that the outcome would have been different
because in such a situation, the equities that were lacking in Tuttle would clearly have been manifest. See
d. at 963-64.
FOOTNOTES
4 While the easement or right that arises is in some ways similar to an implied easement, it is also
arguably [ * * * 1 2 ] an express easement based on the reference to the plat in the conveyance or grant
of the property. See 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.06, at 34-41 to 34-43 (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2000) ("In one sense such an easement is created by
express conveyance, since one can construe the reference in the deed to the bounding street or to the
underlying map as representing the easement. The fact remains, however, that the easement exists
because of the combined effect of a referential phrase in the conveyance and of the circumstances of
the conveyance. Some courts, therefore, speak of such an easement as arising from 'implication.'")
(footnotes omitted). See also 25 Am. Jur, 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 2 1 , at 519-20
(2004) (indicating that different jurisdictions characterize the rights resulting from reference to a plat
differently, with "the 'broad' view . . . designating it] as an easement, to the use of all the streets and
alleys delineated on the map or plat"; the "'intermediate' view, referred to as the 'beneficial' or the
'complete enjoyment' rule, [holding] that the extent of the grantee's private right . . . is limited to
[ * * * 1 3 ] such [uses] as are reasonably or materially beneficial to the grantee and of which the
deprivation would reduce the value of his or her lot"; and "the 'narrow' view, sometimes referred to as
the 'necessary 1 rule, [holding] that the private right . . . is limited to the abutting street and such others
as are necessary to give him access to a public highway") (footnotes omitted).

Further, as shown in Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 4 1 Utah 5 0 1 , 126 P, 959 (1912), the continued vitality of such
an easement turns on the equities that exist at the time of conveyance. See id. at 962-63. Accordingly
when pleading and proving that an easement arose based on reference to a plat, a party would not
necessarily be required to plead and prove the elements of one of the typical easements, i.e., an
easement by necessity, implication, prescription, or expression, as the Association suggests in its brief.
Rather, in accordance with Tuttle and our opinion in this case, a party would only have to plead and
prove that such a right of use was intended to be covered by the grant or sale of the property based on
documents relied on at the time of the conveyance, the parties' knowledge and intent, and the character
or [ * * * 1 4 ] purpose of the road or common area at the time of the conveyance.

[ * P 1 8 ] We further note that a leading treatise on Utah real property law has interpreted Utah's case law
in the same way. See David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Utah Real Property Law § 12.02(b)(2)(iii), at
438 (2008) (stating that n [w]hen an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map (or plat or plan),
a purchaser . . . of a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over private streets as laid out on the
map even if the easement is not expressly created in the documents of conveyance"); see also id. § 12.02
(b)(2), at 436 ( H A / 5 ? " [ I ] m p l i e d easements arise from the circumstances of a transaction or the
circumstances surrounding the properties involved. Courts are willing to imply an easement because they
are convinced that the parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances accompanying a
conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of the perceived, unexpressed
intent of the parties derived from the facts of the situation.") (footnote omitted). Additionally, the majority
view recognizes the existence of easements in favor of landowners whose property abuts private roadways
[ * * * 1 5 ] referenced in a plat. See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 2 1 , at 51920 [ * * 7 0 ] (2004) ( H / v 6 ?"Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to
a plat or map on which streets, alleys, parks, and other open areas are shown, an easement therein is
created in favor of the grantee. Such an easement is deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is
entitled, and exists entirely independent of dedication to a public use. . . . An easement will be implied from
a map or plat only if it was intended by the parties, and no easement can be implied where the grantor has
no interest in the roads reflected on the pl[a]t map.") (footnotes o m i t t e d ) ; 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on
Real Property § 34.06, at 34-40 to 34-41 (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2008) (HN7
?"Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street designated in the conveyance,
or refers to a map on which spaces for streets, parks, or other common uses are shown, but the
conveyance says nothing about the creation of an easement or a dedication to a public use, the conveyee of
the land acquires an easement with respect to the street or the areas shown [ * * * 1 6 ] on the map.")
(footnotes omitted); 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a)(3)(iii), at 480-81 (David A. Thomas, ed.,
2006) (HN8+n,/\ developer's sale of lots in a subdivision according to a recorded plat creates private
easement rights in favor of purchasers in any area set apart for their use.' Those rights . . . exist whether
or not there has ever been acceptance by public authorities or the public generally, on the ground that the
purchasers have given consideration for the property's higher value by paying a higher price. Even where
the dedication by plat or map is not formally accepted by the appropriate authorities, persons who rely on
the plat in making a purchase acquire an interest akin to an easement appurtenant in the rights of way.")
(footnotes omitted).
[ * P 1 9 ] For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that H / V 9 ? w h e n a party acquires land via a deed
that references a recorded plat showing privately owned streets or other privately owned areas of common
use for the apparent benefit of the landowner, a right to use those streets or common areas will typically
arise in favor of the landowner. This right may be enforced not only as against the original developer, but
also as against neighboring [ * * * 1 7 ] landowners who attempt to interfere with the right. In keeping with
Tuttle, however, when the street or common area is privately owned and the dispute is not with the original
developer, equitable considerations come into play. These considerations include the intent of the parties,
notice, and the purpose or use of the roadway or other common area at the time the land was acquired. For
example, if the neighboring owners determined that the street or common area would be used for a
different purpose prior to the new landowner's purchase of his or her lot, and the new purchaser of the lot
had actual or constructive notice of the different purpose for the street or common area—and thus that any

inconsistent plat designation was no longer viable—the right of use suggested by the plat may well be
unenforceable. Cf. Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2004 UT App 256, P 24, 97 P.3d 697 (recognizing
Utah's "longstanding doctrine that a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase of
property with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads have not been legally vacated prior to the
purchase"), aff'd, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432.
[ * P 2 0 ] In accordance with our ruling, the trial [ * * * 1 8 ] court's conclusion that the Griffins had an
easement to use the road based on the deed's reference to the p l a t 5 is sustainable as a matter of law given
that Oak Lane was used as a roadway at the time the Griffins obtained title to lot 2 and is still used as a
roadway. Therefore, at the time the Griffins purchased their property and received a deed referencing the
plat, it was entirely reasonable for the Griffins to assume that Oak Lane was what it purported to be based
on the [ * * 7 1 ] referenced plat, i.e., a street they could use to access their property.
FOOTNOTES
5 Regardless of whether an actual easement arose, the right the Griffins obtained by reason of their
deed referencing the plat clearly encompassed the right to use Oak Lane to access their property given
that Oak Lane was being used in that way when they acquired their property in 1988—some fifteen
years before the Association was even created. See generally Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix,
Inc., 2004 UT 23, P 2 1 , 89 P.3d 155 ( , u [A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any
proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground.'") (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).

I. There Are No Material [ * * * 1 9 ] Disputed Facts
[ * P 2 1 ] The Association further argues that the trial court's summary judgment ruling is not sustainable
>ecause there are three material disputed facts "relating to the use, ownership^] and the nature of Oak
.ane." We disagree. While there are definitely facts in dispute, none of those facts are material to a
letermination of whether the Griffins had a right to use Oak Lane to access their property. See generally
Jtah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
[ * P 2 2 ] First, whether the Griffins continuously used the road does not determine whether or not an
asement or right arose, as would be true with a prescriptive easement. 6 Cf. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah
0 1 , 126 P. 959, 965 (1912) (indicating that a landowner can abandon an easement but that abandonment
f a private easement will not be "lost by mere nonuse[]"); supra note 4 (discussing case law indicating
nat the right of use arises based on equities and the inferred intent of the parties existing when the
rantor grants the property to the grantee). The Griffins' right arose based on their deed's reference to the
^corded plat and the lane's use as a roadway at the time of their acquisition.
FOOTNOTES
5 HN10!h/\ prescriptive easement requires continuous use. See Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, P 17,
377 P.2d 533 [ * * * 2 0 ] ("In order to establish a prescriptive easement in Utah, [one] must show a use
:hat is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and (4) continuous for at least twenty years."). Continuous
jse is also a requirement when claiming a right based on the typical easement by implication. See id. P
L6 ("There are four elements necessary to constitute an easement by implication: (1) unity of title
bllowed by severance; (2) at the time of severance the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible;
'3) the easement is reasonably necessary to enjoy the dominant estate; and (4) use of the easement
vas continuous rather than sporadic"). However, under Tuttle and our ruling in this case, continuous
jse is not necessary when claiming a right of use based on a recorded plat.

*P23]

Second, ownership of the road is not material because the easement came into being irrespective

of who or what entity owned Oak Lane given the Griffins' deed's reference to the plat and the obvious
purpose of Oak Lane as a road by which to access the subdivision lots. 7 And third, the precise nature of the
road is also not material to the resolution of this appeal. 8 The trial court's ruling is based on the legal
determination that [ * * * 2 1 ] an easement arose to use Oak Lane when the Griffins received title to lot 2
and the deed referenced the subdivision plat. Since a right would arise under the facts of [ * * 7 2 ] this
case regardless of whether Oak lane was public, private, or some variation of the two, 9 this fact is also not
material to the legal determination. 10
FOOTNOTES
7 There clearly is a dispute regarding ownership of Oak Lane. One interpretation of the facts, however,
is that the Griffins actually have a part ownership interest in Oak Lane and that therefore the
Association would not have received clear title to Oak Lane when the Griffins did not transfer their
interest in Oak Lane to the Association.
Contrary to the Association's arguments, the plat indicates that the original lot 2 owners were part
owners of the road, as were the other four lot owners. While one of the original owners of lot 2 signed
the quitclaim deed purportedly transferring ownership of the road to the Association, it is doubtful that
he would have retained any ownership interest in the road after lot 2 was transferred to the second
owners. Such ownership interest likely would have been passed from owner to owner with the transfer
of lot 2. Further, while the [ * * * 2 2 ] first owners clearly had an easement or right to use Oak Lane by
virtue of the recorded plat, it is doubtful they would have been able to permanently sever such an
easement or right from lot 2. See generally Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 3 5 1 , 354 (1952)
( H / ¥ I i 7 " [ A J right of way appurtenant to an estate is appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the
benefit of the owners of every part."); Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 272 (1947)
("[F]or it is a well-recognized rule of law that, on a severance of an estate by a sale of a part thereof, all
easements of a permanent character, that have been created in favor of the land sold, and which are
open and plain to be seen, and are reasonably necessary for its use and convenient enjoyment, unless
expressly reserved by the grantees, pass as appurtenances to the land."); Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 4 1 Utah
5 0 1 , 126 P. 959, 962 (1912) (indicating that a private easement arising in a public road based on a plat
is appurtenant to the iand).
8 The opposite was true in the earlier appeal. In Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 2006 UT App
465, 153 P.3d 740, we remanded because we concluded there was a dispute of material fact. See id. P
10. [ * * * 2 3 ] The trial court's earlier decision had rested squarely on the conclusion that Oak Lane was
a common-use private lane, and we determined that the question of whether Oak Lane was a commonuse private lane turned on material facts in dispute. See id. PP 5, 10.
9 To the extent there is a dispute regarding whether the plat clearly shows that Oak Lane was a private
lane, rather than a public lane, such a dispute is not material under our holding because the Griffins'
right to use Oak Lane would have arisen regardless of whether Oak Lane was private or public.
10 We are not unmindful of the real underlying problem, namely that the other lot owners do not want
the Griffins to essentially use Oak Lane as a pad on which to park vehicles and that the Griffins, while
pleased to use the lane, do not want to contribute to its maintenance. Whether such a use is within the
scope of the right the Griffins have in Oak Lane or whether the Griffins can be required to help pay to
maintain Oak Lane has not been briefed, and we accordingly do not resolve these issues. We note,
however, that the trial court's ruling indicates that the Griffins' easement or right of use only includes
"access, ingress and egress [ * * * 2 4 ] from Oak Lane to their property." Furthermore, we note that
when more than one landowner has an interest in an abutting street, absent an agreement otherwise,
the presumption is that they should divide maintenance costs pro rata. See Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven
Assocs., 29 Utah 2d 303, 508 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1973) ("Absent any agreement on the question of
maintenance of a private way, the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and
servient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be
ascertained.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION
[ * P 2 4 ] We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the Griffins summary judgment because
Jtah case law fully supports its determination that a right to use Oak Lane to access lot 2 arose in favor of
:he Griffins when their deed referenced the recorded plat showing that lot 2 abuts Oak Lane, given that Oak
_ane was used as a road to access lots within the subdivision at the time the Griffins purchased lot 2.
r
urther, although some facts are clearly in dispute, none of the disputed facts identified by the Association
are material, given the applicable legal analysis. We accordingly [ * * * 2 5 ] affirm the trial court's summary
udgment ruling.
Sregory K. Orme •, Judge
[ * P 2 5 ] WE CONCUR:
William A. Thorne lr •.,
Associate Presiding Judge
ames Z. Davis y , Judge
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ADDENDUM D

§ 12.02(b)

UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW

§ 12.02(b)(2)

§ 12.02(b). Creation.
§ 12.02(b)(1). Express Easements.
An easement may be created by express words of either a formal grant or of a reservation or
exception in a conveyance of land. A grant creates an easement in the grantee, while a reservation
may result in creating an easement for the grantor in the land being conveyed. Easements may also be
created as a covenant or through a conveyance referring either to a plat depicting easements or to a
recorded declaration of easements.19 The same formalities apply to creation of easements as in anyother conveyance. As an easement is a property interest, the creating instrument must satisfy the
statute of frauds.20 The document should also be recorded in order to provide constructive notice to
any subsequent purchaser.21 Otherwise someone might purchase the property free of the easement
under the doctrine protecting a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice."
Questions of interpretation often arise regarding: (1) the extent of the easement and (2) whether it
is appurtenant or in gross.2" To avoid future litigation the draftsman must use great care to identify
clearly and specifically. (1) the parties, (2) the properties involved, (3) the kind of easement created
(appurtenant or in gross), and (4) the limits, permitted uses, and duration of the easement.24
A recital of consideration should be included if the grant of easement is not incorporated in the
conveyance of the underlying fee.2'
§ 12.02(b)(2). Implied Easements.
Implied easements are three specific types — implied easements based on a prior use, easements by
necessity and easements implied from a subdivision plat.26 While express easements are created by
written expressions of intent, implied easements arise from the circumstances of a transaction or the
circumstances surrounding the properties involved"'. Courts are willing to imply an easement because
they are convinced that the parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances
accompanying a conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of the
perceived, unexpressed intent of the parties derived from the facts of the situation.
19. Robert Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancings 38 CAL. L. REV. 426. 437-38 (1950): see also View
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MS1CO, L.L.C., 90 P.3d 1042. 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (Recording a declaration or plat setting
out servitudes does not, by itself, create servitudes. If all the property is owned by a single owner, then no servitude can
arise. Only when the developer conveys a parcel subject to the declaration do the servitudes arise.).
20. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781-782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
21. See Arnold Industries. Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002) (discussing constructive notice of an easement in spite
of abstraction errors); Evans v. Bd. of County Comnrrs, 123 P.3d 432 (Utah 2005) (not always necessary to fix location of
easement in descriptive language of a deed).
22. See 4 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.21 (Matthew Bender 1998); BACKMAN & THOMAS,

supra note 6. at § 1.02[1].
23. Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590 (Utah 1963); Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
24. A model form for the creation of an easement is included in Robert Kratovil, Real Estate Law 32-33 (Prentice-Hall
8th ed. 1979); see also Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (easement cannot be created in favor of a third
party' who is a stranger to the transaction); Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).
25. See Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
26. A private easement can exist by reliance on a subdivision plat and can extend over abutting public ways. See Carrier
v. Lindquist. 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001).
27. See Butler v. Lee. 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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Once they exist implied easements pass as appurtenances to the land.28 A right of way appurtenant
to an estate is appurtenant to every part, but partition of the dominant tenement cannot create
additional easements across the servient tenement.29
An easement does not inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after division does not
abut the right of way/ 0 Where resulting use after further partition (successive to the severance which
created die easement) will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right to the easement will
be extinguished/1
_. . ,
Implied easements do not violate the statute of frauds because the parties in fact did convey
property through a written document/2 The easement is an inferred expansion of the conveyance
language for the associated property. Strict rules apply to the creation of implied easements because
they are not specifically mentioned in the recorded documents applying to the affected properties.
Fairness to subsequently affected third parties demands that implied easements should arise only
under convincing and compelling circumstances.
§ 12.02(b)(2)(i). Implied Easement Based on Prior Use.
The implied easement based on prior use of the property is recognized if four requirements are
satisfied. First, both the dominant and servient estates must have belonged to the same person as a
single parcel before a conveyance divided the required unity of title/ 3 The original owner may end up
owning a portion of the severed parcel or both portions may be conveyed to two new owners. During
the existence of the unity of title, the owner must use one part of the property to benefit another
portion. Thus, a driveway may cross the front part of the single parcel to provide access to the back
area of the property. While one person owns the whole area, no easement exists because property
owners cannot have an easement over their own property. The beneficial use of the driveway,
however, becomes an easement by implication when the landowner severs the back part of the lot
from the front portion through a transfer to another person.
Second, if a severing conveyance of a portion of the property results in an implied easement, the
prior use must be apparent, obvious and visible at the time of the severance/4 When an inspection of
the property would result in notice of the prior use, the court can assume that the parties were aware
of its existence and that fairness permits recognition of an implied easement.
Third, the easement across the burdened portion of the separated lands must be reasonably
necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant parcel. Courts apply a flexible standard for measuring
necessity. The degree of necessity required by courts will vary with the circumstances/" Generally, a
use is reasonably necessary if it is practical to the claimant's use of his property or if significant
expense would arise in providing for an alternative solution if the claimed easement were not

28. Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947).
29. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See B AC KM AN & THOMAS, supra note 6, at § 2.02[1].
33. Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1979); Choumos v. Alkema, 494 P.2d 950, 952 (Utah 1972); Butler v.
Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
34. Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
35. Butler, 774 P.2d at 1154.

§ 12.02(b)(2)(ii)
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recognized. If the grantor is claiming to have reserved an implied easement, the courts generally
apply a stricter measurement of proof than when it is alleged to arise in favor of the grantee;16
Fourth, to have an implied easement based on a prior use, the benefited party must continue to use
the easement."7
§ 12.02(b)(2)(ii). Easement by Necessity.
The easement by necessity is based on the public policy of maximizing the productive use of
land."'8 This type of implied easement is recognized because it is necessary in order for the easement
holder to have reasonable use of the dominant property. Thus, a landlocked property would be cut off
from access to any public roads unless the courts recognize an implied easement across a neighbor's
property. The required circumstances are similar for both the easement by necessity and the implied
easement based on prior use.j9 The requirements are: (1) unity7 of title followed by severance. (2t
apparent obvious and visible use, (3) necessity of the easement for enjoyment of the dominant estate.
and (4) continuous use.40 The test for necessity is greater for the easement by necessity'' than in the
case of an easement implied from prior use.41 Such an easement is based on the theory of a grant by
reason of the circumstances at the time of severance, and is inconsistent with the adversity
contemplated in the prescription theory.42
Several limitations apply to recognition of an easement by necessity. A claimant cannot have the
benefits of an easement by necessity if that person has created the conditions producing the
necessity.43 An owner who blocks an existing access road by building a structure is not entitled to an
easement by necessity over neighboring property. The claimant can remedy the lack of access by
removing the obstructing building. The easement by necessity terminates if the need for the easement
no longer exists.
§ 12.02(b)(2)(iii). Implied Easement Based on a Subdivision Plat
When an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map (or plat or plan), a purchaser who of
a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over private streets as laid out on the map even if
the easement is not expressly created in the documents of conveyance.
§ 12.02(b)(3). Prescriptive Easements.
An easement may be created by prescription (adverse use) for an extended period. Adverse use
differs from adverse possession in that an adverse user has merely used the property for a right of way
or other easement purpose, rather than using it as owner. The purpose of these related doctrines is to
protect parties against disruption of expectations they have had over a period of years without
36.
37.
38.
39.
Corp.,
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 34.08[4].
Chournos, 494 P.2d at 952 .
See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 6, at § 2.02[3][b].
Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001); Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources
555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976).
Savage v. Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948).
Alcorn v. Reading, 243 P. 922, 926 (Utah 1926).
Id.
See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 34.07.
Williams v. Shearwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984); see also POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 34.1Q.
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of the way, the grantee acquires a right to the way not merely in front of his
or her property, but also to the full extent of the way as indicated.5 However,
the grantee may acquire a right in a way described as a boundary only to the
extent necessary to give him or her access to a public street or highway.6
§21

On c o n v e y a n c e w i t h reference to map or plat

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <3=»17(3), (4)
Conveyance of lot with reference to map or plat as giving purchaser rights in indicated streets,
alleys, or areas not abutting his lot, 7 A.L.R. 2d 607
Complaint, petition, or declaration—For declaratory judgment as to way of necessity—Conveyance from common grantor as a private dedication of and grant of right-of-way. Am. Jur.
Pleading and Practice Forms, Easements and Licenses § 14
Proof of Intent to Abandon Easement, 53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 519

Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to a plat or map on which streets, alleys,1 parks, and other open areas 2
are shown, an easement therein is created in favor of the grantee. Such an
easement is deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is entitled,3
and exists entirely independent of dedication to a public use.4
An easement created on conveyance with a reference to a map or plat is
not negated by the fact that the map or plat is not properly made or recorded
for purposes of dedication.5 Such an easement also is not negated by the
mere failure of the public authorities to accept the streets or ways, or by an
abandonment of them.6
Such an easement does not arise unless the conveyance refers to the map
or plat which indicates the way, park, or other area in which an easement is
5
Jones v. Sedwick, 383 Pa. 120, 117 A.2d
709(1955).
6
Brooks-Garrison Hotel Corp. v. Sara Inv.
Co., 61 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1952).

[Section 21]
1
Judge v. Rago, 570 A.2d 253 (Del. 1990);
Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Homart
Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d 214
•1992); Bache v. Owens, 267 Mont. 279, 883
P-2d 817 (1994); Catalano v. Woodward, 617
A.2d 1363 (R.I. 1992); McAllister v. Smiley,
•301 S.C, 10, 389 S.E.2d 857 (1990); Ryder v.
Petrea, 243 Va. 421, 416 S.E.2d 686 (1992):
Russakoffv. Scruggs, 241 Va. 135, 400 S.E.2d
529 0991).
A developer's conveyance of parcels in a
private community to two i n d i v i d u a l s , as
-rustees of the developer, with a deed reference s a tiled map t h a t illustrated roads in the
immunity, did not convey an ownership inter':-* m roads, giving rise to an easement by

implication. II Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven
Land Co., 254 Conn. 502, 757 A.2d 1103 (2000).
2
Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Homart Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d
214 (1992); Bache v. Owens, 267 Mont. 279,
883 P.2d 817 (1994); McAllister v. Smiley, 301
S.C. 10, 389 S.E.2d 857 (1990).
3
Catalano v. Woodward, 617 A.2d 1363
(R.I. 1992); Epps v. Freeman, 261 S.C. 375,
200 S.E.2d 235 (1973).
4
Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Homart Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d
214 (1992); Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679,
484 A.2d630 (1984).
5
Hackert v. Edwards, 22 Conn. Supp. 499,
175 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct. 1961); Catalano v.
Woodward, 617 A.2d 1363 (R.I. 1992).
6
Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Hornart Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d
214 tl992); Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679,
484 A.2d 630 (1984); Estojak v. Mazsa, 522
Pa. 353, 5 6 2 A . 2 d 2 7 1 (1989).
519
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claimed.7 An easement will be implied from a map or plat only if it was
intended by the parties, 8 and no easement can be implied where the grantor
has no interest in the roads reflected on the plot map.9
Under the "broad" view adopted by some jurisdictions, the grantee acquires
a private right, frequently designated as an easement, to the use of all the
streets and alleys delineated on the map or plat.10 Other jurisdictions support the "intermediate" view, referred to as the "beneficial" or the "complete
enjoyment" rule, that the extent of the grantee's private right of user in
streets or alleys shown on the map or plat is limited to such as are reasonably or materially beneficial to the grantee and of which the deprivation
would reduce the value of his or her lot.11 Still other jurisdictions adhere to
the "narrow" view, sometimes referred to as the "necessary" rule, that the
private right of user accruing to the grantee in the streets and alleys referred
to in the map or plat is limited to the abutting street and such others as are
necessary to give hirn access to a public highway.12
b.

On Severance of Property
(1)

Easements

Implied from Preexisting

Uses

(a) In General
§22

Generally

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements @=»15.1
Answer—Defense—To claim of implied easement by reservation. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice
Forms, Easements and Licenses § 92.
Complaint, petition, or declaration—Obstruction of artificial drainage—Ditch draining residential subdivision—Implied, drainage easement. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Waters
§255
Proof of Intent to Abandon Easement, 53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 519

Where an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one
part of an estate in favor of another part of the same estate or property,
which servitude is in use at the time of severance and is necessary for the
7

Brooks-Garrison Hotel Corp. v. Sara Inv.
Co., 61 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1952); Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286 S.E.2d 739
(1982).
Where the recorded plot showed ways and
streets for property abutting the claimant's
property, but the plot did not delineate the
claimant's property, no easement was
established. Judge v. Rago, 570 A.2d 253 (Del.
1990).
8
Mikels v. Rager, 232 Cal. App. 3d 334,
284 Cal. Rptr. 87 (4th Dist. 1991), reh'g
denied and opinion modified, (Aug. 13, 1991);
Jackson v. Knott, 418 Mass. 704, 640 N.E.2d
109 (1994).
*Mikels v. Rager, 232 Cal. App. 3d 334,

520

284 Cal. Rptr. 87 (4th Dist. 1991), reh'g
denied and opinion modified, (Aug. 13, 1991);
Stankiewicz v. Miami Beach Ass'n, Inc., 191
Conn. 165, 464 A.2d 26 (1983).
10
Stanley Heights Property Owners Ass'n,
Inc. v. Whiteside, 151 Colo. 429, 378 P.2d 399
(1963); Yurmanovich v; Johnston, 19 Wis. 2d
494, 120 N.W.2d 707 (1963).
11
Enos v. Casey Mountain, Inc., 532 So. 2d
703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1988); Jacoway v. Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987); Bauer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of
Elkins, 173 W. Va. 438, 317 S.E.2d 798 (1984).
12
Jackson v. Knott, 418 Mass. 704, 640
N.E.2d 109 (1994); De Ruscio v. Jackson, 164
A.D.2d 684, 565 N.Y.S.2d 593 (3d Dep't 1991).
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dedication would then return to those from whom it had been dedicated, rathei
than to the abutting landowners. 137 It would not be unreasonable, though, foi
courts to assume that the fee ownership would have passed with the adjoining
land absent an explicit statement to the contrary, in the same way as h done
with railroad right of way easements. 138 In one case, for example, where an 1872
statute created public highways from all section lines in specified counties, those
highways granted only an easement to the public; the fee title continued to be
vested in the abutting landowners, in that case the original owners. 139 Attempted
statutory dedications that fail some requirement sometimes will still fulfill the
requirements to be considered a common law dedication. 140 One description oi
the requirements for such a dedication is "(1) the parly platting the land intended
to create an easement, and (2) the public accepted the easement." 141 In Texas,
mere failure to object to use by the public will not establish a common law or
implied dedication: there must be some clear and unequivocal declaration by an
owner of an intention to set the road apart for public use. 142 An easement b>
implied or common-law dedication and a public easement by prescription are
sometimes difficult to distinguish, and the cases do not always do so successfully. 143

§ 60.03(a)(3)(iii)

Common Law Dedication by Reference to
Map or Plat.

One may dedicate land to the public by express language, by reservation, or
by conduct showing an intern to dedicate. Such conduct intending a dedication
may exist "where a plat is made showing streets and the land is sold either by
express reference to such a plat or by a showing that the plat was used and referred
137

Terwelp v. Sass. 443 N.E.2J 804. 800 (III. App. 1982).
138
See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 622 A.2d 642. 647-648 (Del. 1993).
13
9 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. ComnVn. 664 P.2d 798. 800 (Kan. 1983) (abutting
landowners were those from whom the easement was taken).
140

Reiman v. Kale. 403 N.E.2d 1275. 1277-1278 (III. App. 1980).

141
See also Lncvano v. Maesias. 874 P.2d 788. 794 (N.M. App. 1994) (including as essential
elements acts inducing belief owner intended dedication, that landowner was competent, that public
relied on acts and will benefit from dedication and that there was offer and acceptance ol
dedication): Koehler v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 370. 373 (111. App. 1990) (finding no dedication, but
finding access easement by implication from prior use), citing Reiman v. Kale. 403 N.E.2d 1275
1277 (III. App. 1980).
14
Z Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185. 189-190 (Tex. App. 1992). See also Chttds v. Sammons,
534 S.E.2d 409. 410 (Ga. 2000) (mere use even for extended time by small portion of public doc5
not support inference of dedication without express intention to dedicate and acceptance by public
authorities).
143
Luevano v. Maestas. 874 P.2d 788. 794-795 (N.M App. 1994) (cases do not provide with
clarity a basis for distinguishing prescription from implied dedication).
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144

lin negotiations for the sale."
"A developer's sale of lots in a subdivision
icording to a recorded plat creates private easement rights in favor of purchasers
i atty area set apart for their use." 1 4 5 Those rights include areas like streets
nd parks, and exist whether or not there has ever been acceptance by public
jthorities or the public generally, on the ground that the purchasers have given
uhsideration for the property's higher value by paying a higher price. 146 Even
-here the dedication by plat or map is not formally accepted by the appropriate
jthorities, persons who rely on the plat in making a purchase acquire an interest
kin to an easement appurtenant in the rights of way. 147 Though the public may
e foreclosed after the passage of sufficient time without acceptance by the
overnmental unit or general public use, those who have purchased in reliance
n the roads shown in a plat or plan retain a private easement that cannot be
bridged by the governmental body absent compensation. 148 This right applies
> all members of the subdivision who purchased in reliance on the plat or plan,
ot merely those with property abutting the easement. 149 Use by the public can
self constitute acceptance even in the absence of formal acceptance by public
uthorities.150 Where a deed of dedication could not be found, reference to the
edicated street in a recorded plat served to establish the easement. 151 Simple
lention of the existence of a road in a deed without, the requisite offer to and
cceptance by the public authorities, however, may not suffice to create a
edication.152
COMPUTER-ASSISTED RESEARCH
LEXIS: Easement /25 Dedicat! /25 Slatut! /25 Common law or Common Law
/25 Distinguish or Distinct! or Difference

60.03(a)(4) Who May Create Express Easements.
.: Because an easement is an interest in land, anyone who is the possessor of
be land may burden it with an easement: that easement cannot last any longer
144
Price v. Walker. 383 S.E.2d 086. 688 (N.C. App. 1989): Volco. Inc. v. Lickley. 889 P.2d
099, 1102-1103 (Idaho 1995) (marked streets on recorded plat demonstrating dedication of
uadway easements).
**5 Northpark Assocs. No. 2. Ltd. v. Homart Dev. Co.. 414 S.E.2d 214. 215 (Ga. 1992).
146
Id. at 215-216.
14
? Price v. Walker, 383 S.E.2d 686. 688 (N.C. App. 1989).
148
See also Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112. 1116 (Utah 2001) (quoting this sentence) (dismte concerning private easement over former public alley: easement survives vacation of alley).
»olis v. Coon. 496 A.2d 1188. 1192 (Pa. Super. 1985).
14
*> Id. at 1193.
iBOCatalano v. Woodward. 617 A.2d 1363. 1368 (R.I. 1992).
iSlTown of Sparta v. Hamm, 387 S.E.2d 173. 175-176 (N.C. App), rev. denied 389 S.E.2d
119 (N.C. 1990).

152 Hereford v. Gingo-Morgan Park, 551 So. 2d 918. 920 (Ala. 1989).
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§ 34.06 Easements Can Be Created by Reference to Boundaries or Maps
Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street designated
in the conveyance, or refers to a map on which spaces for streets, parks, or other
common uses are shown, but the conveyance says nothing about the creation of an
easement1 or a dedication to a public use,2 the conveyee of the land acquires an
Wisconsin: Walterman v. Village of Norwalk, 145 Wis. 663, 130 N.W. 479 (1911).
1
See, e.g., United States v. Sandlass, 34 F. Supp 81 (D.NJ. 1940) (deed referred to map that showed
roadway).

See also:
Delaware: Tindall v. Corbi, 37 Del. Ch 491,145 A.2d 247 (1958) (deod describing lot as bounded by
private road).
Florida: Tallahassee In v. Corp. v. Andrews, 185 So. 2d 705 (Ha. Dist. Ct App. 1966) (where titles of
both plaintiff and defendants were from common source, neither title contained any reference to or
reservation of streets and beach in plat of subdivision, and only mention of plat was for identification of
starting points or boundaries, defendant's land was not burdened with easement for streets and beach).
Idaho: Villager Condominium Ass'n v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 121 Idaho 986, 829 R2d
1335 (1992); Smylie v. Pearsall. 93 Idaho 188, 457 P.2d 427 (1969).
Maryland: Adams v. Peninsula Prod ExcL, 138 Md. 656, 115 A. 106 (1921).
New York Huggins v. Castle Estates, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 427, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80, 330 N.E.2d 48 (1975)
(reference to zoning restriction on plat map did not create negative easement).
—
Pennsylvania: Reed v. Reese, 473 Pa. 321, 374 A.2d 665 (1976) (where unrecorded plan showed park
adjacent to plaintiff's lot and plaintiff's deed referred to plan, easement for plaintiff established).
Rhode Island: Robidoux v. Pelletier, 120 R.I. 425, 391 A.2d 1150 (R.I. 1978) (recorded plat was all
that was needed to disclose landowner's dedicatory intent).
Tennessee: Baker v. Butler. 51 Teiux App. 111. 364 S.W.2d 916 (1962), cert, denied, 211 Tenn. 314,
364 S.W.2d 922 (1963).
Washington: Clippinger v. Birge, 14 Wash. App 976. 547 P.2d 871 (1976) (no easement found on
plat).
Wisconsin Yurmanovich \. Johnston, 19 Wis. 2d 494, 120 N.W.2d 707 (1963).
But see Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Ass'n. 93 Conn. App. 759. 890 A.2d 645 (2006) (citing this
Treatise; ("Here, the individual defendants' deeds included express easement provisions giving them the
right to use the roads of the subdivision
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' argument, concerning easements
that are implied from maps referenced in deeds, clearly does not pertain to the facts of this matter, and
the court correctly concluded that it was inapplicable.")2

The filing of a tract map constitutes a public dedication of the streets shown thereon in some states,
as for example, in Kentucky. See Rudd v. Kittinger, 309 Ky. 315, 217 S.W.2d 651 (1949). It constitutes
only an offer of public dedication in other states, which is revocable prior to acceptance by the appropriate
municipal authority. See People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70. 22 P. 474 (1889); Rose v. Fisher. 130 W. Va. S3,
130 W. Va. 53, 42 S.E.2d 249 (1947). In the former of these types of jurisdictions, the existence of a
private easement of way is seldom important under such deeds as are discussed in this section, but in the
second type of jurisdiction such private easements can have importance when an offered dedication is
rejected or revoked, as for example, in Burkhard v. Bowen. 32 Wash. 2d 613. 203 P.2d 361 (1949).
commented on in 26 Wash. L. Rev. 142 (1951).
Florida: Mumaw v. Roberson, 60 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1952) (finding no acceptance of offer of public
dedication and that private easement created by conveyance referring to plat on which street and beach
were shown barred by adverse possession); City of Miami v. Eastern Realty Co.. 202 So. 2d 760 (1967)
(ReL 122-3/2008 Pub.550)
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easement with respect to the street3 or the areas shown on the map.4 In one sense such
(where subdivides dedicated park strip to purchasers of lots and expressly provided that there was no
dedication to public, but thereafter over extensive period of time city maintained park without objection
by subdivides, their successors, or lot owners, offer of dedication and acceptance of park strip by city for
public could be inferred).
Illinois: Cook v. Mighell Constr. Co., 40 DL App. 3d 1032,353 N.E.2d 43 (HI. App. Ct. 1976) (where
landowners' rights were derived from platting of subdivision and street was vacated by municipality,
landowners abutting vacated street, and those seeking access thereto, had easement of access of their
property that was not extinguished by municipality's vacating street).
Michigan: Rindone v. Corey Community Church, 335 Mich. 311, 55 N.W.2d 844 (1952) (deed
referring to recorded plat entitled grantee to use of streets and ways laid down on plat regardless of
whether there was sufficient dedication and acceptance to constitute public dedication).
New Hampshire: 700 Lake Ave. Realty Co. v. Doileman, 121 N.R 619, 433 A.2d 1261 (1981).
Mew York: Stupnicki v. Southern N.Y. Fish & Game Comm'n, 41 Misc. 2d 266, 244 N.Y.S.2d 558
(1962); O'Hara v. Wallace, 83 Misc. 2d 383, 371 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1915) Judgment modified O'Hara v.
Wallace, 52 A.D.2d 622, 382 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dept. 1976).
Rhode Island: Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361 (R.I. 1982).
3

Mills v. Smith, 203 Ga. 444, 47 S.E.2d 260 (1948).

See also:
Maryland: Layman v. Gnegy, 26 Md. App. 114, 337 A.2d 126 (1975).
Massachusetts: Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89, 89 N.E.2d 8 N.E.2d (1949); Patterson v.
Simonds, 324 Mass. 344, 86 N.E.2d 630 (1949).
Montana: McPherson v. Monegan, 120 Mont 454, 187 P.2d 542 (1947).
Nevada: City Motel Inc. v. State, 75 Nev. 137, 336 R2d 375 (1959).
Pennsylvania: Pods v. Coon, 344 Pa. Super. 443, 496 A.2d 1188 (1985).
South Carolina: McAllister v. Smiley, 301 S.C. 10, 389 S.E.2d 857 (S.C. 1989) (court held that
northern adjoining landowners had implied easement at law over road on northern boundary of their
southern adjoining landowner's property).
Virginia: Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 159, 41 S.E.2d 617 (1947) (finding implied easement m street
created by reference to map).
See:
Federal:

Smith v. deFreitas, 329 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1964).

Connecticut: Gerald Park Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. Bini, 138 Conn. 232, 83 A.2d 195 (1951).
Maine: Arnold v. Boulay 147 Me. 116, 83 A.2d 574 (1951).
Maryland: Klein v. Dove, 205 Md 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954).
Massachusetts: Olson v. Arruda, 328 Mass. 363, 104 N.E.2d 145 (1952).
Missouri: Larkin v. Kieseimann, 259 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953).
New York: Hecht v. Launer, 30 Misc. 2d 47, 222 N.YS.2d 569 (1961), afa\ 14 A.D.2d 964, 222
N.Y.S.2d 687 (1961); Feuer v. Brenning, 279 AD. 1033, 112 N.Y.S.2d 382, afd, 304 N.Y. 881, 110
N.E.2d 173 (1953); Fiebelkom v. Rogacki, 280 A.D. 20, 111 N.YS.2d 898, afa\ 305 N.Y. 725, 112
N.E.2d 846 (1953); Fortwal Realties, Inc. v. Fitzsimons, 117 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1952).
Ohio: Krzewinski v. Eaton Homes, Inc., 108 Ohio App. 175, 161 N.E.2d 88 (1958).
Pennsylvania: Jones v. Sedwick, 383 Pa. 120, 117 A.2d 709 (1955).
Rhode Island: Vailone v. City of Cranston, 97 R.I. 248, 197 A.2d 310 (1964).
(ReL 122-3/2008

Pub.550)

